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How to improve public investment efficiency in Ukraine?  
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations 
Public investment can both serve socially useful purposes and be growth enhancing, if 
sufficient levels are allocated efficiently and if budgeting is managed properly.  
Public investment in Ukraine has recently risen from low to sufficient levels. Private 
participation in investment for socially useful purposes, such as road construction and 
other infrastructure investment, is still small. 
Activities with doubtful rationale for long-term state intervention (economic activities, 
utilities) receive one third of all public capital expenditure. More than half of this is aid in 
form of capital transfers to public enterprises, allocated in long bargaining processes.  
Public investment budgeting rules suffer from a lack of integrated treatment with respect 
to decision-making bodies, components of capital expenditures, and planning horizons.  
At current public investment levels, the impact on the economy can nevertheless be 
increased.  
• Socially useful investment can be boosted by more private sector involvement in the 
financing of roads and other infrastructure, including utilities, by concession schemes. 
• Improved investment budgeting requires  
o transparent priorities and rules-based selection criteria (cost-benefit analysis);  
o smoother integration of capital expenditures in the budgeting process; capital 
and maintenance budgeting can be harmonized by multi-year controls. 
o Resource ceilings in project selection should be set early, to minimize demand 
for public funds and to avoid long bargaining processes for public aid.  
• In the medium term, state aid in form of capital transfers to public enterprises can be 
re-allocated towards core public activities, education, and health. 
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1. Definitions and recent trends  
1.1. Definitions 
Throughout the paper public investment is defined as capital expenditure financed out of 
the central or local budgets, in the Treasury definition. This comprises purchases of fixed 
assets including repairs and reconstruction, the creation of state reserves, purchases of 
land and intangibles, and capital transfers to enterprises, other levels of government, the 
population, or abroad. This differs from Derzhkomstat’s definition of public capital 
investment, also used in this paper.1  
 
1.1. Recent public investment levels in Ukraine  
Income losses during the nineties implied substantial revenue shortfalls for public 
budgets. Ensuing fiscal austerity had a much more severe impact on public investment 
than on current expenditures, implying some deterioration of the infrastructure (energy 
transmission and distribution, telecommunications, transport, water and sanitation). 
Chart 1: Public investment as a share of GDP, in % 
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Data sources: “Ukraine. Public Investment Review”, Report No 16399-UA, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2001, for 1994–96, and Treasury reports since 2000. 
Note: World Bank and Treasury data follow different definitions and are not readily comparable. 
 
Following macroeconomic stabilization, the GDP share of public investment has 
recovered (chart 1). The evolving picture appears to be consistent with a shrinking role 
of government: while total (private and public) fixed capital investment has increased 
from 13.3% in 1997 to 16.8% of GDP in 2002,2 the share of publicly financed fixed 
investment in the total has decreased by nearly 3.2 percentage points to 8.7% during 
                                                          
1 Derzhkomstat data don’t include maintenance, purchase of land and intangibles, and are not 
accurate in reporting the source of finance. The Treasury uses cash methods of accounting, while 
Derzhkomstat statistics are based on accrual methods. 
2 Source: Derzhkomstat, Statistical Yearbook 2002.   
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the same period. Although post-2000 total public investment data shown in Chart 1 are 
not readily comparable to earlier data, one can infer that since 2001 there has been a 
shift of public investment away from local levels to the central government. 
 
1.2. Public investment levels in an international perspective 
At 20.3%, Ukraine’s share of (private and public) fixed capital formation in GDP was in 
2002 fairly low, but still within reasonable limits for a transition economy.3 With respect 
to public investment, the gap appeared more significant (chart 2), especially when taking 
into consideration austerity-induced investment needs in infrastructure. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between per capita GDP and public 
investment. The size of government, e.g. depending on private versus public ownership 
in infrastructure, matters. Also, public investment often involves large projects creating 
vested interests with inefficient outcomes. Sufficient shares of public investment in GDP 
are thus certainly much smaller than the highest levels indicated in Chart 2. 
Chart 2: Public investment as a share of GDP  
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Note: Most OECD countries’ public investment to GDP ratios are between 3 and 5 per cent. 
Data sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics and International Financial Statistics, World 
Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, and IER calculations. 
 
On the basis of recent increases (chart 1), current public investment levels in Ukraine 
are comparable to OECD levels and do not appear to be insufficiently low.  
Further raising public investment in Ukraine, however, meets fiscal constraints. The 
major restriction on central government investment stems from high subsidies and 
current transfers (Table 1).4 Local government investment is hampered by a lack of own 
financial resources.5 Thus, raising the impact of public investment on the economy is less 
                                                          
3 The UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Common Database reveals a median of 21.1% for a 
sample of 25 transition economies in 2002, or most recent. 
4 Most of which is transition-related social transfers to households. Current transfers to local 
governments made up 20% of total current transfers and subsidies in 2001. 
5 Cf. IER, Openness and Transparency of Public Finance in Ukraine: Analysis and 
Recommendations, December 2003. 
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a problem of the amount but rather of the efficiency of public investment expenditure.  
Table 1: Shares of central government expenditures, in % of total 
 Goods and 
services 
Wages and 
salaries 
Interest 
payments 
Subsidies & 
other 
current 
transfers 
Capital 
expenditures 
Region/Country 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
World 39 37 23 18 10 9 23 31 13 13 
Low and middle 
income  
 39  21  9  26  16 
Transition 
economies 
31 31 9 12 3 9 57 49 10 10 
   Central Europe 
   and Baltics 26 28 10 13 2 6 54 57 10 8 
   Southeastern 
   Europe 
38 32 12 14 3 13 51 43 8 11 
   CIS 37 35 2 12 2 11 46 44 16 11 
   Ukraine  30  13  7  57  6 
High income  25 29 13 11 11 7 56 59 7 5 
Notes: Wages and salaries are part of goods and services. Ukrainian figures are for 2001. 
Data source: World Bank, Word Development Indicators 2003. 
 
2. How to allocate public investment in a market economy? 
The decision whether an investment project should be publicly or privately financed, 
must be based on a clear understanding of the role of the state in a market economy. 
The limits of useful state intervention are in principle well defined, and follow from two 
arguments: markets may fail to supply some goods in efficient amounts, or market 
outcomes may be in conflict with agreed upon notions of equity within society. 
• Public goods and services. Their consumption by one person does not diminish 
availability to others, while nobody can be excluded from consumption. These goods 
are not supplied in efficient amounts on markets. There are very few “pure” public 
goods, defining the core public activities (defense, public order, justice, general public 
services, social protection). Infrastructure only partly fulfills these criteria: e.g., an 
individual can be excluded from using a road, and Kyiv traffic jams are vivid proof of 
temporary rivalry in consumption. 
• For some private goods, market structures make unregulated competition deliver 
inefficient outcomes. These include natural monopolies or network industries in 
infrastructure, e.g. energy distribution, telecommunications, water and sanitation. 
Recent advances in regulatory practices have weakened the argument for public 
provision of many of these goods in favor of publicly regulated private provision.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
6 IER/GAG, “Multi-utilities: Panacea or barrier to competition?”, Advisory Paper T16, Kyiv, 
December 2003. 
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• Transition may temporarily justify public restructuring on private markets to attract 
subsequent private investment. The Ukrainian coal sector could be a case in point.  
All this implies that the market failure argument for direct long-term state intervention is 
not strong, and that the state certainly need not completely replace private markets in 
investment into commercial activities and infrastructure on efficiency grounds.  
• Equity considerations may make market outcomes socially unacceptable and provide 
strong ground for public investment to ensure equal access to a socially agreed upon 
catalogue of goods and services. Examples include health care and education, which 
also exhibit spillover effects of merit goods: individuals often ignore the social return 
of human capital investment or health care. 
 
3. The allocation of public investment in Ukraine 
3.1. Government objectives  
Two sources7 list five priorities for investment support: (1) the fuel and energy complex 
and the implementation of energy and resources saving technologies, (2) the social 
sphere, production of consumer goods and services, and competitive export-oriented 
products, (3) agriculture, (4) the medical and microbiological complex, (5) overcoming 
the consequences of the Chornobyl catastrophe. 
Measured against the list of goods and services with potential for government 
intervention in section 2, these priorities appear dominated by intervention on private 
markets or only temporarily valid transition-specific concerns [(1), (3), and (4)]. Only 
(5) is undoubtedly a case of public intervention based on equity concerns, while (2) does 
not include a workable definition to begin with. The Concept disregards priorities for local 
government investment, and also leaves it unclear whether it implies public investment 
priorities or public support for private investment policies in whichever form, from capital 
transfers to investment tax expenditures.  
Thus, the Concept is a rather unreliable benchmark for the actual allocation of public 
investment in Ukraine. 
 
3.2. Public investment by function 
With the new budget code, a new functional budget expenditures classification in full 
conformity with IMF standards was introduced in 2001. Accordingly, pre- and post 2001 
expenditure data are not comparable. Chart 3 shows 2002 central and local consolidated 
budget capital expenditures reflecting all general functions on both levels of government.  
In the majority of functions, public budgets are not the only sources of investment 
finance. In fact, from the discussion in section 2, it is clear that they should not be 
except for the four public goods cases of defense, public order and justice, general public 
services, and social protection. These core public activities, however, cover only roughly 
one third (36.3%) of all public capital expenditures in 2002. Another third is made up by 
investment in environment, health, education, and culture, much of which rightly 
responds to equity considerations and spillover effects of merit goods.  
                                                          
7 The Concept of Regulating Investment Activity under the Conditions of Market Transformation of 
the Economy as of January 1, 1995, #384, with amendments of February 15, 2002, and the MoE 
Order On Approving the Decree on Assessment and Selection of Investment Projects.  
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Capital expenditures on functions with doubtful rationale for long-term state intervention 
(the broad sector of all economic activities and utilities) receive public investment in the 
same order of magnitude (34.5%). More than half of this is state aid in form of capital 
transfers to publicly owned enterprises. The share of all capital transfers to enterprises in 
consolidated public investment was 24% in 2002 (on the selection process, see section 
4.2).8 
 
Chart 3: Consolidated budget capital expenditures, 2002 (UAH m) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Utilities include other (minor) housing and communal services capital expenditures. 
According to the Budget Code, public investment in utilities is financed out of local budgets. Most 
economic activity expenditures are financed out of the central budget, while road financing is split 
between central and local budgets according to relevance. On the allocation of tasks between 
state and local government, see IER/GAG, “Setting up a framework for efficient local budget 
expenditures”, Advisory Paper T20, Kyiv, February 2004. 
Data source: Statistical Bulletin, Capital Investments in Ukraine for the Year 2002. 
 
Detailed figures on central government capital expenditure on economic activity reveal 
that the 2004 state budget will establish road financing as a new core activity (43% of 
capital expenditure for economic activity, up from 6.5% in the 2003 draft budget), along 
with the established areas agriculture (3.2%), coal (34.3%), and electricity generation 
(13.6%).  
Given the need for infrastructure upgrading, the shift towards road construction appears 
to go in the right direction. However, the size of the shift is debatable and would have 
offered an opportunity to substantially increase private sector involvement in the 
provision of socially useful purposes while at the same time easing the pressure on 
public budgets.  
 
Private sector involvement 
                                                          
8 Most of central government capital transfers go to coal mining, while capital transfers to utilities 
are financed out of local budgets. 
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Private sector involvement in public investment activities is most promising in 
infrastructure: it serves socially useful purposes and has a potential for revenue 
generation. The financing of road construction provides a classic opportunity, usually 
involving concession schemes through which private firms finance and build the project 
and then operate it for a pre-defined period of time, recovering the investment by 
collecting user tolls. This can be an efficient instrument for increasing investment in 
infrastructure and simultaneously concentrating limited budget resources on investment 
in core public activities, education, and health.9 
Although the legal basis for using concessions exists in Ukraine, World Bank data 
indicate that between 1997 and 2002 the sum of private and public investments in 
completed infrastructure projects with private participation totaled only USD 338.5 m. 
None of this was in road construction, but in natural gas and electricity transmission.10  
Attempts at making use of road concession schemes have only started in 2002 when 
concession agreements were reached concerning construction and use of roads between 
Lviv and Brody and Krakivets and Lviv. Especially, the construction of the Kyiv-Odesa 
highway, to be completed as a toll road by December 2004, envisages private co-
financing. However, this particular private involvement seems less effective, as much of 
it originates with the NBU, which refinances commercial banks’ buying corporate bonds 
of Ukrzaliznytsya at lower than market rates.11  
 
3.3. Regional distribution  
Chart 4: Per capita public capital investment (UAH) by oblast,  
ranked by GDP per capita   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For Chilean experiences, see A. Gómez-Lobo and S. Hinojosa, “Broad roads in a thin country”, 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2279, Washington, DC, January 2000. 
10 Hungarian projects totaled some USD 1.4 bn in the same period. See the World Bank’s Private 
Participation in Infrastructure database, http://rru.worldbank.org/PPI/index.asp 
11 This is within the framework of NBU credits for “innovative investment”, criticized in GAG/IER, 
"The NBU decree on long-term refinancing: good intention, questionable approach", Advisory 
Paper S9, Kyiv, 2002. 
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Source: Derzhkomstat, Statistical Bulletin of Capital Investments for the Year 2002, pt. I, p. 8 
On equity grounds, public goods provision may aim at equalizing living conditions. In a 
regional perspective, this would imply public investment per capita to be higher in 
regions with lower income. Ranking oblasts by average 2000–2 per capita GDP reveals 
that this is not the case in Ukraine (chart 4). In fact, things are rather the other way 
round: the simple correlation coefficient between per capita GDP and per capita public 
capital investment across all 27 oblasts is 0.71, i.e., most public capital investment flows 
into rich regions. Much of this, however, is due to very high local budget capital 
investment in the city of Kyiv with a GDP per capita more than 2.5 times as high as the 
Ukrainian average. Disregarding Kyiv, the correlation coefficient drops to 0.15 (0.20 and 
0.10 for local versus central government capital expenditures per capita, respectively). 
Central government capital investment in Ukraine does not serve regionally re-
distributive purposes from rich to poor oblasts. 
 
4. Rules for investment budgeting  
4.1. General features  
Numerous acts influence public investment budgeting, and recent improvements are 
closely connected to the overall improvement of budget legislation.12 Despite this 
progress, capital expenditure budgeting still suffers from shortcomings.  
Decisions on capital expenditures are not yet integrated with respect to the decision 
making bodies, the different components of capital expenditures, capital versus current 
expenditures, and planning horizons. 
• As a part of the Program of Social and Economic Development, on the basis of 
regional (drafted by local administration and self-government bodies) and industry-
specific development programs (drafted by respective ministries), the Ministry of 
Economy (MoE) drafts and monitors the development budget, which covers central 
government financed fixed capital investment and investment in R&D. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) is responsible for drafting both capital and 
current budget expenditures. However, capital expenditures require an integrated 
treatment within overall budgeting. Separating investment from current expenditures 
makes it difficult to see trade-offs and may result in an inefficient allocation of funds. 
• Due to fragmented decision making, decisions on various components of capital 
expenditures are not made in accordance. Maintenance and repair expenditures are 
not included in the development budget but are decided on by the MinFin upon 
proposals of key spending units. Still, the comparatively high share of repairs in all 
public investment (19% in 2002) makes economic sense.13 
                                                          
12 This concerns the implementation of the Budget Code (2002, marking the turn to program-
based public budgeting), the Law on Public Procurement (2000), the Law on Concessions (2000) 
and the CMU Decree on Approving the Methodology of Calculating Payments for Granting 
Concessions for the Construction and Use of Roads (2003), the cancellation of the majority of 
privileges with the approval of the State Budget Law 2004, and restrictions on providing state 
guarantees. 
13 MinFin, Budget Statistical Book Budget 2002. Although state capital transfer rules to local 
budgets to not encourage maintenance and repair on local level: priority is given to those budgets 
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• Creating future liabilities, capital expenditures require a multi-year planning horizon, 
while the budget as well as the Program of Economic and Social Development are 
approved yearly. As investment is discretionary, there is a danger of project 
interruption according to budget pressure. In a long-term perspective, delays, cost 
increases, and under-investment in long-term projects are inefficient.  
• Due to fragmented decision making, capital expenditures financed out of the central 
government budget often differ from the approved development programs. However, 
development programs are not properly updated.14  
Planning and decision making on capital expenditures lack transparency. 
• There is no discussion of alternative development programs. 
 
4.2. A closer look at capital transfers: state budget financed project selection  
Before including a project into the development budget, it is subject to project 
competition.15 This involves a three-stage decision process defined in the CMU Decree 
(1999) on the Order of Evaluation of Investment Projects that requires fund-sharing 
between enterprises and the central government budget.  
• Enterprises submit a project proposal to a ministry for fund-sharing in an investment 
project.16 Priority setting, evaluation, and first-stage selection are all done within this 
ministry, and its selections cannot be appealed.17 Selection is rather discretionary: 
criteria include efficiency and social aspects, but there are no transparent, centrally 
pre-defined rules-based criteria to ensure overall efficient use of budget funds.  
• The MoE decides on submitting first-stage selections as part of the Development 
Program to the MinFin for inclusion in the draft budget. 
• Within 20 days of budget approval, the final project selection is done by the MoE, 
with the total amount of budgeted capital expenditures as an ex-post ceiling. Fund-
sharing with a public firm results in a capital transfer, with a private firm the result is 
an investment grant (which is a very rare case18).  
Due to the late stage of setting resource ceilings, capital transfer decisions are prone to 
drawn-out bargaining. The process is biased towards creating excess demand for public 
funds during the first stage, and in a long-term perspective results in too much state aid 
to loss-making public enterprises.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
where expenditures on maintenance of budget entities were lowest for the preceding 3 years. In 
Russia, that figure dropped from 17% in 1997 to about 8% in 2000. World Bank, Russia: 
“Improving the efficiency of public investment expenditures”, Report No. 22693-RU, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2001. 
14 The Ukrainian Coal program envisages fixed capital investment of UAH 2.3 bn and UAH 2.25 bn 
during the years 2003 and 2004, respectively. Approved state budget capital transfer figures for 
this purpose amount to UAH 1.26 bn for 2003 and UAH 1.7 for 2004. 
15 This also holds for government procurement as one type of state capital investment, to be 
conducted by open tender except for very small amounts. 
16 E.g., the Ministry of Energy may formulate an investment project within the Ukrainian Coal 
Program to improve employment conditions, solving environmental and social problems, improve 
equipment, or, very generally, further the financial recovery of coal mining enterprises. 
17 Cf. IER, Openness and Transparency of Public Finance in Ukraine: Analysis and 
Recommendations, December 2003. 
18 Direct communication with MoE, Department of Investment. 
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5. Policy recommendations 
At current levels of public investment, their impact on the economy can nevertheless be 
increased. This requires above all a clear definition of public investment priorities and 
objective rules-based selection criteria. Deviations from rules-based decisions have to be 
made explicit. 
 
5.1. Immediate recommendations  
Increase efficiency and transparency of project decision making   
• Raise information availability. This will facilitate better informed political discussions 
on alternative uses of funds.19  
• Make the use of objective and transparent procedures such as cost-benefit analysis a 
standard input to efficient program selection, in order to at least eliminate the 
poorest projects from the selection process. 
• In all project selection processes, set resource ceilings at an early stage, to minimize 
demand for public funds and avoid drawn-out bargaining processes for state aid.  
Increase private sector involvement in infrastructure projects 
• Socially useful investment can be increased by more private sector involvement. On 
central government level, this concerns concession schemes for road financing and 
other infrastructure.20 On local level, this could involve utilities and local transport. 
Improve the integration of capital expenditure in the budgeting process 
• Improve the division of tasks between the MoE and the MinFin in terms of linking 
decisions on new projects versus maintenance. Regularly update multi-year period 
development programs against actual budgets. 
• Implement a medium-tem planning procedure requiring medium-term budget 
estimates for spending units. Combined with efficient project selection, this helps 
policymakers to see the long-term consequences of their decisions. To begin with, 
harmonize capital and maintenance decisions by introducing multi-year controls.21  
 
5.2. Medium-term recommendations  
                                                          
19 E.g., publish info on investment tax expenditures, the functional allocation of local public 
investments, or on the regional distribution of total public investment, which the authors were 
unable to find when preparing this document. Also, cf. IER, Openness and Transparency of Public 
Finance in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations, December 2003. 
20 These can prepare for later privatization subject to public regulation. GAG/IER, “Public-private 
Partnership as Alternative to Privatization, with an Application to OJSC Ukrtelecom”, Advisory 
Paper S20, Kyiv, 2003. 
21 As has recently been done in the Czech Republic, where a "Program Financing Initiative" was 
designed to allow government to commit funding to investment projects beyond the annual 
budget. Project proposals must include a work description, a statement of financial resources 
required over its life, and a cost-benefit analysis. A newly devised database helps to monitor 
spending and progress of multi-year projects. 
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• In the medium term, lower state aid on capital transfers (incl. to coal mining22 and 
utilities). Social liabilities can be more efficiently dealt with by temporary transfers to 
households rather than sustained capital transfers to enterprises. 
• Raise investment in core public activities and merit goods, such as education and 
health. This could also make central government investment more re-distributive 
from richer to poorer regions, which is justifiable on equity grounds.  
R.F., N.L., Lector: I.A. 
                                                          
22 See also GAG/IER, “Ukrainian steam coal: Not competitive or just mismanaged?”, Advisory 
Paper T19, Kyiv, December 2003. 
